

A Finance Ph.D. Student's Encyclopedia
First Edition

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About this book

This book includes notes from all of the finance courses I took during my Ph.D. studies. The list of topics include Investments, Event Studies, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Financial Institutions, Asset Pricing, Market Microstructure, and more. In my opinion this is the only book available that covers such a comprehensive list of topics.

After leaving my notes dormant for years I decided to assemble them into this book and make them available to you. I believe the core theories and principles of finance are covered quite well in this first edition text. If you would like to supplement these comprehensive finance notes with focused econometrics notes consider my other book, *Applied Finance and General Statistical Analysis*.

Thank you for purchasing this text. May it aid in your fulfillment of your Ph.D. requirements...

-David J. Moore, Ph.D.



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